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ABSTRACT
Election administrators anecdotally mention that many ballots get signed by someone
else in the household, such as the husband signing the wife’s ballot. If household members are
signing each other’s ballots mistakenly, then there should be a rise in mismatched signatures as
the number of people in the household increases. By matching household addresses of registered
voters and the addresses that ballots were mailed to from the 2020 Florida general election, the
study found that the probability of a signature mismatch did increase as the number of household
members increased. While the data showed that black and Hispanic households have more
people in a household, the household size did not account for the higher rates of signature
mismatches among blacks and Hispanics.
This research proposes placing the voter’s name under the signature line to reduce the
number of mismatched signatures. Other envelope design features, such as arrows, power of
attorney notices, and layout, were measured to determine the effectiveness of envelope designs.
Simpler design features were more effective. If the voter’s name can be added under the
signature line without disruption, it could decrease the number of ballots signed by the wrong
household member.
Overall, household members signing the wrong ballot contribute approximately one
additional mismatched signature per 100,000 ballots. With over 15 million voters in Florida,
where close elections and recounts are the norm, preventing this problem from occurring can
make a difference in electoral outcomes.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................... ix
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 3
Does Race Matter? .......................................................................................................... 3
Late, Unsigned, and Mismatched Signatures .................................................................. 5
Signature Verification Devices ....................................................................................... 7
Household Mismatches ................................................................................................... 8
Ballot Design .................................................................................................................. 9
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS ....................................................................................... 12
Household effect on mismatched signatures................................................................. 12
Household effect vs Racial effects ................................................................................ 14
Placing the Voter’s Name under the Signature Line .................................................... 15
Evaluating Ballot Envelope Designs ............................................................................ 18
Location .................................................................................................................... 19
Key Words ................................................................................................................ 20
Layout ....................................................................................................................... 20
DATA AND METHODS ................................................................................................. 22
iv

Voter Registration and Mail Ballot Status .................................................................... 22
VBM Status Codes........................................................................................................ 24
Late Ballots ................................................................................................................... 24
Errors In versus Errors Unresolved............................................................................... 25
Householding ................................................................................................................ 25
Public Institutions ..................................................................................................... 26
Senior Homes ............................................................................................................ 27
Address Matching ......................................................................................................... 27
Standardization ......................................................................................................... 28
Parsing....................................................................................................................... 28
Differences in Address Matching Methods .............................................................. 29
Designing a Ballot with the Voter’s Name under the Signature Line .......................... 29
Ballot Designs ............................................................................................................... 32
Arrow Front .............................................................................................................. 33
Arrows on Back ........................................................................................................ 35
Power of Attorney ..................................................................................................... 39
Red Box Layout ........................................................................................................ 40
County Statistics ....................................................................................................... 40
RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 42
Household Size Effect................................................................................................... 42
v

Reversal in Age Effects ............................................................................................ 46
Age versus Vote-by-Mail History............................................................................. 47
Household effect vs Racial effects ................................................................................ 48
Placing the Voter’s Name under the Signature Line .................................................... 51
Ballot Envelope Designs ............................................................................................... 52
Vote by Mail Count .................................................................................................. 54
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 60
Future Research ............................................................................................................ 63
APPENDIX A: DUPLICATES ........................................................................................ 64
APPENDIX B: COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS ............................................................... 66
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 70

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Center for Civic Design Return Ballot ................................................................. 9
Figure 2 Red Box Return Envelope Design ...................................................................... 11
Figure 3 Plain Signature Box ............................................................................................ 11
Figure 4 Address Area on Ballot Envelope ...................................................................... 17
Figure 5 Arrows on Front and Back of Envelope ............................................................. 19
Figure 6 Red Box Layout for Signature Area ................................................................... 21
Figure 7 Envelope Design with Voter's Name by Signature ............................................ 30
Figure 8 Envelope Design with Voter Name by Existing Signature Line ........................ 31
Figure 9 Arrow Front Minor Indication ............................................................................ 33
Figure 10 Arrow Front Examples of Full Indication ........................................................ 34
Figure 11 Extra Indication for Signature .......................................................................... 35
Figure 12 Minor Arrow on Back ...................................................................................... 36
Figure 13 Major Arrow on Back ....................................................................................... 37
Figure 14 No Arrow on Back............................................................................................ 38
Figure 15 Power of Attorney - Full Indication ................................................................. 39
Figure 16 Power of Attorney - Minor Indication .............................................................. 40
Figure 17 Mismatched Signatures by Household Size ..................................................... 43
Figure 18 Signature Mismatches by Age .......................................................................... 47
Figure 19 Household Size by Race ................................................................................... 49
Figure 20 VBM Counts by County and Scaled VBM Category ....................................... 55

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 VBM Status Codes............................................................................................... 23
Table 2 Probit Regression of Signature Mismatches ........................................................ 45
Table 3 Race effects on signature mismatches ................................................................. 50
Table 4 Regression Analysis of Location Arrows ............................................................ 53
Table 5 Regression Analysis of Power of Attorney Key Words ...................................... 53
Table 6 Regression Analysis of Red Box Layout ............................................................. 54
Table 7 Regression Analysis of Envelope Designs using VBM Count ............................ 57
Table 8 Regression Analysis of Envelope Designs using Scaled VBM ........................... 57

viii

LIST OF ACRONYMS
CI

Confidence Interval

DMV

Department of Motor Vehicles

EAC

US Election Assistance Commission

EAVS

Election Administration and Voting Survey

HAVA

Help America Vote Act

FL DOE

Florida Division of Elections

FSE

Florida Supervisors of Elections

FVAP

Federal Voting Assistance Program

FVRS

Florida Voter Registration System

NCSL

National Conference of State Legislatures

NVRA

National Voter Registration Act

SOE

Supervisor of Elections

UOCAVA

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act

VBM

Vote-by-Mail

ix

INTRODUCTION
In 2018, a report by the ACLU found that mail ballots in Florida had a higher rejection
rate for young and ethnic minority voters (Smith, 2018). While the report did not claim racial
bias by election administrators as a cause, subsequent news reports (Lemongello, 2018)
(Robinson, 2018) and public opinion frequently jumped to that conclusion, especially around the
effects on minority voters. But what part of the signature verification process would lead to
signatures from black or Hispanic voters getting rejected more frequently? Signatures are
scanned and compared by the same machines used for bank and credit card transactions, so how
is there a bias in the signature verification machines used by election administrators but not in
those used for business? Would the signature verification machines even be able to distinguish if
a signature were from a black or white voter?
In Florida, canvassing boards that review rejected signatures are open to public viewing.
I attended one for the 2020 primary election and learned about a particular phenomenon.
Household members would sign the wrong envelope, such as the husband signing the wife's
envelope and vice-versa. The election officials said it was quite common and is usually resolved
as long as both family members return the missigned envelopes. This gave me a new theory to
investigate for signature rejections. Suspecting that black and Hispanic voters have larger
numbers of people in their households, I hypothesized that their higher rejection rate could be
due to having a larger household size.
The household size effect could have a simple solution: place the voter’s name under the
signature line. Legal documents commonly include the person’s name and/or title as indicators
1

beneath the signature line to show who is supposed to sign where. This common design tactic
could be used to help resolve some of the signature mismatches. Before testing a ballot envelope
design, however, I first needed to determine whether the problem of household members signing
the wrong ballot is a significant problem worth addressing, or is it merely anecdotal? I reasoned
that if household members were signing each other’s ballots mistakenly, then the frequency of
mismatched signatures should increase as the number of people in the household increases.
I collected the Vote-by-Mail reports from the 2020 Florida general election. The Voteby-Mail reports identify whether a ballot had a missing a signature or a mismatched signature
and include the date when it was returned to the election administration office. This allowed for
the classification of rejected ballots as either late, unsigned, or mismatched. I matched the mail
ballot addresses and addresses from the voter file to get a count of voters in the household.
Analysis showed there is a household size effect with more signature mismatches occurring as
the household size increases. This empirically demonstrates that household members are
mistakenly signing each other’s ballots.
I also requested a copy of the 2020 mail ballot envelopes from all of Florida’s 67
counties. I found that ballot envelope designs had similarities among the counties, but there was
no common ballot envelope design used by all counties. Having the mail ballot envelopes
allowed me to test the effect of variations in ballot envelope designs. For example, was it
effective to have an arrow on the front of the envelope reminding the voter to sign the back?
Effective changes in mail ballot envelope design could be a way to reduce signature errors and
increase the number of intended votes that are counted.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a small subfield of political science research that looks at mail ballot rejection. I
classify these studies into two camps. The first camp of research gives an overview of common
election processes across multiple states and gives recommendations for which methods work
better. See (Burden & Gaines, 2013), (Neisler, 2020), and (Montjoy, 2008). Because election
laws vary by state, these give an overall description of the election process, highlight where the
main differences are, and may give a high-level recommendation of best practices. The second
camp of research focuses on rules and results within a single state. See (Smith, 2018), (Baringer,
Herron, & Smith, 2020), (Alvarez, Hall, & Sinclair, 2008), (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021),
and (Shino, Suttmann-Lea, & Smith, 2021). By focusing on election results from a single state,
these studies gain more insight into who is affected by the election processes in place. While
there is still some variance in election procedures by county (Alvarez, Hall, & Sinclair, 2008),
focusing on one state gives enough results to measure for significance while controlling for
county-fixed effects. This approach also allows the study to test specific theories on what causes
ballot rejection, such as the number of letters in the name (Baringer, Herron, & Smith, 2020), or
the voter’s prior experience with mail ballots (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021). Because my
study focuses on testing the theory that the number of people in the household affects the number
of mismatched signatures, the literature review focuses on research in the second camp that
offers more detailed studies based on election results.
Does Race Matter?
Returning to the ACLU report, while it reports that mail ballots for racial minorities were
rejected two-and-a-half times as often as whites (Smith, 2018, p. 13), the report does not include
3

statistical analysis that would validate if these differences are statistically significant. The report
merely compares the percentages between ethnic groups and election years and notes the
difference in rates. It does not determine whether race was significant or was a causal factor.
Fortunately, two other reports analyzed the same Florida election data used by the ACLU
report and applied statistical methods that addressed my concern. The first study by Baringer,
Herron, & Smith (2020, p. 307) confirms that while blacks and Hispanics had a higher ballot
rejection rate than whites, the difference was not statistically significant once other factors for
party and gender were included which accounted for the difference. This study also included
analysis of name complexity such as including a middle name, a hyphen, apostrophe, or other
special characters which Hispanic names frequently include. None of the complex names caused
a significant difference in signature rejection. Instead, the name discrepancies tended to decrease
the chances of the signature being rejected (Baringer, Herron, & Smith, 2020). This is in line,
though, with the forensic signature literature, which focuses on the overall handwriting style
rather than making sure that all i’s are dotted, and t’s are crossed. While Hispanic names might
be rejected by signature matching machinery, name complexity may have the opposite effect on
human inspection as it gives the viewer more cues to look for. This gives reason to believe that
Hispanic signatures should not have more rejections than white signatures. Rejection rates for
Hispanics may have more to do with an unclear translation of the instructions or an inability to
get help from election officials (White, Nathan, & Faller, 2015).
A second report by Cottrell, Herron, and Smith (2021) addressed the effects of voter
experience, which could account for age effects found in the ACLU report (Smith, 2018). It
found that voters who had not previously used mail ballots had higher mail ballot rejection rates
4

universally across late, unsigned, and signature mismatched ballots (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith,
2021, p. 13). Even controlling for experience, however, there was still an age effect where young
voters, even those experienced with mail voting, were more likely to return the ballot late than
were older voters without mail ballot experience (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021, p. 20). For
signature mismatches, however, margins based on race, sex, or age were negligible (Cottrell,
Herron, & Smith, 2021, p. 23).
Research from other states produced mixed results. A study using Georgia mail ballots
found race was not significant for late ballots but was for rejected signatures (Shino, SuttmannLea, & Smith, 2021). Other studies on race and elections focus on minority turnout (Elul,
Freeder, & Grumbach, 2017), (Pryor, Herrick, & Davis, 2019), (Hajnal, Lajevardi, & Nielson,
2017) or lack of information available to minorities (White, Nathan, & Faller, 2015). However,
these only explain the disenfranchisement effects of who gets to vote. They do not explain the
ballot rejection of those that do manage to vote. The mixed results of race on ballot rejections
indicate there may be some bias due to race, but we do not yet fully understand why. This
emphasizes the need to look deeper into the election process for any potential bias.
Late, Unsigned, and Mismatched Signatures
Cottrell, Herron, and Smith (2021) separate ballot rejections into three types: ballots
arriving late, unsigned ballots, and ballots with a voter error. Most ballots were rejected because
they were late. Voter error was the least common reason (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021, p.
10). Voter error is mostly attributable to mismatched signatures where the signature on the ballot
is rejected because it does not match the voter’s signature on file. There are other minor reasons,
such as duplicates or the voter died (Burden & Gaines, 2013). For the purposes of my research,
5

ballots marked as voter errors that were not late or unsigned were counted as mismatched
signatures. This is in keeping with current research methods in this field of study (Baringer,
Herron, & Smith, 2020) (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021).
Reporting on these three issues separately is important not only for research but also for
media reporting. When news or social media report large numbers of ballot rejections, the
reaction is to believe there is ballot fraud whether it happened or not (Burden & Gaines, 2013).
Therefore, it is important to be clear and consistent when reporting ballot rejections and include
the type of ballot rejection – mail ballots being late, unsigned, or signature mismatches – that is
causing it. For example, reporting a large number of mail ballot rejections without indicating
that the mail ballots arrived late can imply a bias in signature verification by election officials
rather than user error of the voter waiting too long to send it. Unfortunately, the type of rejection
may not be reported in all states. Some states only report that a mail ballot was rejected and do
not give more detailed reasons, which can lead to speculation of bias.
In the 2020 presidential election, concern arose over how to count late ballots, and court
cases ensued (Shamsian, 2020) (Fessler, 2020) (Gringlas, 2020). The main contention was over
how states declare a ballot to be on time. Some states allow ballots to arrive after election day as
long as they are postmarked before the election, while other states require the ballot to arrive at
the election office by election day. Late ballots are additionally problematic for military and
overseas voters (Alvarez, Hall, & Roberts, 2007) (Coleman, 2012). Under the Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), ballots must be sent to military and
overseas citizens 45 days before a federal election (FVAP.gov, 2021). However, the deadline to
return military ballots still varies by state hinging on either arrival time or postmark dates as
6

noted above. States may allow a later deadline or accept postmarks on UOCAVA ballots that
differ from the rules for civilian mail ballots. While this is a good practice that allows more time
for military and overseas voters, the different deadline rules pose a constitutional question of
equal protection for voters which is the prevalent requirement since Bush v. Gore (2000).
Signature Verification Devices
Because signature verification is used in a variety of commercial uses, there are whole
fields of research around the topic. Forensic studies of signatures take a more traditional route,
observing differences in slant, letter size, and spacing (Mohammed, Found, Caligiuri, & Rogers,
2015) (Marquis, Cadola, Mazzella, & Hicks, 2017). Computer and engineering fields apply
these forensic methods to the digital world, focusing on matching algorithms used by signature
verification devices. See (Diaz, et al., 2019), (Jain, Griess, & Connell, 2002), (Cpalka &
Zalasinski, 2014). Mail ballot processing devices used by election administrators use this
signature matching technology to validate signatures. Signatures rejected by the machines are
then evaluated by election officials. Experience with forensic signature matching is what
election officials ultimately rely upon for inspecting ballots rejected by the automated systems,
though the level of experience of election workers and election officials varies widely (Janover
& Westphal, 2020).
A survey of California election officials showed that only the largest used automatic
signature verification systems. Most only used machines that would capture the image of the
signature while sorting the ballots but not validate the signatures. The signature image scanned
from the ballot would then be compared to the signature on the voter file by election staff
(Janover & Westphal, 2020). The use of technology was related to the county size. Smaller
7

counties normally did everything by hand using election workers, but counties with populations
in the millions frequently used more automated systems just to get through all of the ballots on
time. Janover and Westphal (2020) noted, though, that all ballots with a signature mismatch
were reviewed by at least two people in all counties.
Janover and Westphal (2020) also gathered comments from election administrators on
abnormalities that made signature verification difficult. This included: signatures becoming
shaky with age; cursive handwriting no longer being taught to younger generations; the DMV
using a pen pad for the signature which produces a slightly different signature than the paper
signature provided on the ballot; younger people using hearts and emojis in their original
registration signatures but omitting them years later (Janover & Westphal, 2020, p. 331). Some
of these may cause a difference by race or age in rejections by machines, but they would still be
reviewed by a human who could mitigate these problems. The list, however, represents issues
that could be further researched but go ignored as insubstantial problems.
Household Mismatches
Two articles noted election officials mentioning the problem of family members signing
the wrong ballot, but it was not considered a substantial problem (Janover & Westphal, 2020)
(Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021). It could be that the problem was easy for election officials to
reconcile so it did not appear to them as problematic, or the problem truly could be minor, as
they suggest. Still, if the household size effect can explain part of the reason for racial bias in
rejections, it is worth investigating. Also, if the cost of implementing a solution (i.e., placing the
name under the signature line to prevent the problem) is low, then the solution may also be worth
implementing, even for a minor problem.
8

Ballot Design
Most studies on ballot design focus on the ballot where the voter’s choices are recorded
rather than the envelope where the signature is. This is because poor ballot design can cause
overvotes or undervotes, which can change election results. For example, the 2018 ballot for
Broward County, Florida, was found to have a design that caused voters to skip over the first
race for US Senate (Ross, 2020). It appeared below the ballot instructions causing an undervote
for the race (McCadney & Norden, 2020).

Figure 1 Center for Civic Design Return Ballot
Source: Center for Civic Design (2020)
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There are design guidelines and templates for ballot envelopes widely available. The
Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), US Election Assistance Commission (EAC),
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the Center for Civic Design, and the US
Postal Service all offer templates, guidance, and requirements for designing ballot envelopes.
While design templates are readily available, the ballot envelopes I received from the Florida
counties show they are seldom used. The Center for Civic Design envelope uses a distinctive
coloring on the left side of the return envelope to distinguish it while being processed through the
US postal service (Figure 1). Out of the 64 Florida counties that supplied me with a sample of
their ballot envelope, only three used the Center for Civic Design envelope (Center for Civic
Design, 2020).
Though few Florida election offices have adopted the Center for Civic Design envelope,
there were common design elements used from county to county. Roughly one-third of the
counties used the red box from Figure 2 for the signature area. The rest use a plain box as in
Figure 3 or some variation in between. The commonality indicates that local election officials
will frequently copy off of each other. This in turn produces a standard template in place of one
designated by the state. In 2017, the Florida Supervisors of Elections (FSE) conference included
a presentation on mail ballot designs that various county Supervisors of Elections had used
(Conte, 2017). This indicates some willingness of local election officials to try improvements
but also an overall reliance on seeing what others do and getting feedback on the results before
others implement the changes.

10

Figure 2 Red Box Return Envelope Design
Source: Seminole County SOE (2020)

Figure 3 Plain Signature Box
Source: Escambia County SOE (2020)
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
How often are household members signing the wrong ballot? Election officials have
given researchers anecdotal evidence that household members will mistakenly sign the wrong
ballot (Janover & Westphal, 2020) (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021). But both election officials
and researchers have treated it as a minor anomaly and not investigated further. If this is an
actual problem, though, then empirical evidence should be able to indicate the frequency at
which it occurs. This will allow researchers to quantify the scope of the problem and allow
election officials to weigh its likelihood and costs against other issues.
Household effect on mismatched signatures
H1: In a comparison of people who voted by mail, voters with a larger household
count are more likely to have their ballot rejected as a signature mismatch than voters with
no one else in the household.
If household members are signing each other’s ballots mistakenly, then there should be a
rise in mismatched signatures as the number of people in the household increases. Household
size would initially be the number of registered voters in the household, but it is further
complicated by mail voting since the ballot may be mailed to a different address. For household
members to sign the wrong ballot, the ballots have to end up at the same house. Therefore, the
household count was calculated as a count of how many mail ballots were sent to the address.
Adding to that is the potential problem where a voter who is not registered for vote-by-mail but
lives with people who do receive a mail ballot may also mistakenly send in a family member’s
mail ballot believing that anyone can fill it out and send it in. This means that in addition to
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counting voters with a mail ballot, I also needed to include any other registered voter without a
mail ballot at the address because the potential for signing someone else’s ballot is still there.
Any voter can have a signature mismatch on their own without signing the wrong
envelope. Single-member households can also have signature mismatches. The question is, can
I attribute an increase in signature mismatches by household to the explanation of household
members signing the wrong envelope? If signing the wrong envelope is not a problem, then I
should not see a significant effect by household count. The mistakes that cause signature
mismatches should normally be randomized across voters. Other factors such as age, experience,
and county differences should account for most of the variance (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith,
2021). One other potential problem that could also be linked to household size is a family
member signing for an elderly member who has writing difficulties. If a family caretaker
commonly signs documents for the elderly member, either through the power of attorney or
otherwise, they may sign the ballot envelope just as they do other forms. Election administrators
are also aware of this problem. 73% of the Florida ballot envelopes had some form of marking
that indicated signatures as power of attorney were not allowed.
Even with family members signing for the elderly, it is still the same basic problem of
someone in the household signing another person’s mail ballot. Signing for elderly or disabled
family members will increase the household effect, but the results can be mitigated by
controlling for age. Specifically, since age normally decreases the number of signature
mismatches (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021), the age at which signature mismatches begin to
increase can be determined and attributed to caretakers signing for an elderly member. The
remaining portion of the household effect can then be attributed to household members
13

mistakenly signing the wrong ballot. While the same effect from elderly and disabled family
members may still overlap, the solution, adding the voter’s name under the signature line, can
still help resolve the problem for all household members.
Household effect vs Racial effects
Census data shows that black and Hispanics have larger household sizes (Rogers, 1996)
(Statista, 2021). The larger household sizes may account for some of the ballot rejections seen in
black and Hispanic voters. Household members signing the wrong ballot would not affect mail
ballots being rejected for being late or unsigned, only mismatched signatures. Therefore, when
analyzing the probability of a voter having a mismatched signature, the probability attributed to
blacks and Hispanics should decrease once the household size is accounted for.
H2a: When accounting for household size, black voters are less likely to have their
ballot rejected as a signature mismatch than when household size is not accounted for.
H2b: When accounting for household size, Hispanic voters are less likely to have
their ballot rejected as a signature mismatch than when household size is not accounted for.
Without accounting for household size, the racial effects may pick up some of the
household size effects due to blacks and Hispanics having larger household sizes. This is akin to
a voting model that included racial affects but did not control for factors such as party or age.
Without party or age, the differences due to party or age may be incorrectly attributed to the
racial variables. Once party and age are added into the model, the amount of effect previously
attributed to race should decrease since the model now attributes the effect to the more dominant
party and age factors. Similarly, if other household members are signing each other’s ballots,
then household size could be a more dominant predictor of signature mismatches than race. If
so, then once household size is added to the model, then the coefficients for race should
14

decrease. Comparing the analysis results for race before and after adding household size to the
model will give a measure of how much of the original racial effects are attributed to the
household. The difference would indicate that the analysis is correctly attributing the
mismatched signatures to the household effect rather than lumping it in with racial effects. My
predictions in the H2 hypotheses are that the racial effects will decrease once the household size
is accounted for.
While this does not account for all racial effects on mail ballot rejections, it is helpful to
explain what may be causing racial effects. If part of the racial effect is attributable to the
household size, then that leaves fewer rejections that can be blamed on the racial bias of election
administrators. Even if there is systemic racial bias in the system, identifying where it is coming
from allows officials and researchers to focus on its causes.
Placing the Voter’s Name under the Signature Line
H3: In a comparison of counties, placing the voter’s name under the signature line
will decrease the number of mismatched signatures
My proposed solution to the problem of household members signing the wrong ballot
envelope is to place the voter’s name under the signature line. Just as legal documents have the
person’s name or title printed below the signature line to show where to sign, doing the same in
the signature area on the ballot envelope would tell household members which one of them needs
to sign the ballot. This simple design change should then reduce the number of mismatched
signatures. Hypothesis 3 evaluates if adding the voter’s name is effective by seeing if the
number of mismatched signatures decreases when the design is incorporated. Because ballot
envelopes are printed and designed per county, the experiment requires an initial trial of the
15

design by one or more counties willing to participate. Then the before and after-effects of using
the design can be measured assuming other changes are held constant.
Overall, the generic design of ballot envelopes makes it easy for voters to believe that the
envelopes are interchangeable. Since the voter’s name or information is not included in the
required oath, instructions, or signature area, the voter can easily read through the instructions
and sign the envelope without noticing that the ballot is coded to someone else. The voter’s
name is only included in the address area, the area outlined in orange in Figure 4, which is
usually either off to one side, printed in the reverse direction as the rest of the instructions, and/or
in an office-use-only area which causes it to be easily ignored (Seminole County SOE, 2020).
Merging the address area with the signature area, or at least adding the voter’s name under the
signature line would individualize the ballot envelope so that voters can tell that it is specific to
the voter and not interchangeable.

16

Figure 4 Address Area on Ballot Envelope
Source: Seminole County SOE (2020)
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Unfortunately, placing the voter’s name under the signature line could have a negative
effect for blacks and Hispanics. If election officials reviewing the signature identify the person
as black or Hispanic it could result in discrimination that causes them to be rejected more
frequently. This is in line with research experiments that change the name on a resume or
information request to a black or Hispanic name which then receives fewer responses (White,
Nathan, & Faller, 2015) (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). For ballot signature validation,
though, reducing the household effect where the wrong person signs the ballot should prevent it
from being flagged as a signature mismatch and avoid manual review, thus limiting the possible
discrimination later. However, only larger election offices use systems that automatically verify
the signature. Most capture the signature for review by election officials. This does present an
opportunity for bias to be introduced due to placing the name under the signature. While a
person’s often illegible signature may not indicate a person’s race. The printed spelling of the
name below the line could identify the person’s race and trigger racial bias. This gives
justification for including controls for racial effects in the experiment.
Evaluating Ballot Envelope Designs
Can the layout and design of the ballot envelope cause or reduce errors? From previous
research on ballot design (Kimball & Kropf, 2005) (Ross, 2020) (Niemi & Herrnson, 2003), we
know that small changes in the location of instructions, shading or highlighting areas, and using
bold fonts can work together to produce a more readable ballot that produces fewer overvotes
and undervotes. I can therefore expect that changes to the ballot envelope design should also
help reduce voter errors. The main error with ballot envelopes is not signing them. Because
there is no state-wide design for the ballot envelope in Florida, each county election
18

administrator has its own design. Election administrators often copy parts of the envelope design
from each other. This gives some common design features that still have enough variance in
usage that they can be tested for effectiveness. By determining whether existing envelope design
features make a difference in reducing signature errors, I can establish a rationale that other
design changes could also have an effect.
Location
To remind voters to sign the ballot, arrows are placed on the front and/or back of the
envelope to draw attention to the signature area. See Figure 5. The difference in placement of
arrows on the front or back gives an opportunity to validate whether the location of the arrow
makes a difference. 67% of the counties have some form of an arrow on the back. This
conforms with design research that recommends placing instructions nearest to where they are
needed (Dillman, 2006).

Figure 5 Arrows on Front and Back of Envelope
Source: Left: Clay County SOE (2020). Right: Bradford County SOE (2020)
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Placing an arrow on the front of the envelope gives the voter a second reminder to check
the signature as they place a stamp on it or place it in a mailbox. This presents an opportunity to
determine whether the arrow location has a significant design effect on reducing unsigned
ballots. Hypothesis 4a tests if placing the arrow on the front makes a difference. This gives us a
test of how the location of information in the envelope design affects voter errors.
H4a: In a comparison of counties, placing an arrow on the front of the envelope to
indicate they need to sign the back will decrease the number of unsigned envelopes
Key Words
A second common feature of the envelope designs is including a warning that Power of
Attorney is not allowed. If included, it was almost always included directly above or below the
signature area. This allows me to test specific wording effects. Does the specific mentioning of
power of attorney reduce the number of signature mismatches? Hypothesis H4b predicts that it
will. This also acts as a control in the study because family members or caregivers signing for an
elderly person under power of attorney would also add to the household size effect on
mismatched signatures. Testing the effect of the power of attorney warning, therefore, controls
for the number of signature mismatches reduced by using the warning in the design.
H4b: In a comparison of counties, placing a warning that Power of Attorney is not
allowed will decrease the number of mismatched signatures
Layout
The third envelope design feature I looked at was the layout of the signature box itself.
The design in Figure 6 has a distinctive red box that highlights and draws attention to the
signature area (Seminole County SOE, 2020). It was used in a consistent manner by one-third of
the counties. Other counties varied from a Microsoft Word style table to a plain signature line
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after the oath and instructions. This presents an opportunity to determine whether the layout
does better at reducing the number of unsigned ballots. For testing, hypothesis H4c predicts that
the more distinctive red box layout will reduce unsigned ballots more than the table design.
H4c: In a comparison of counties, using the red box layout will decrease the number
of unsigned envelopes more than the table layout

Figure 6 Red Box Layout for Signature Area
Source: Seminole County SOE (2020)
In conclusion, testing the features of the existing ballot envelope designs is a way to
determine whether design changes are effective or not. If effective, it will lend support to the
idea that changing the envelope design to place the voter’s name in the signature line should also
be effective in reducing the household size effect on mismatched signatures. This will help
election administrators evaluate whether making the design change is worth the effort.

21

DATA AND METHODS
Data from the Florida 2020 general election was used for this study. Florida has sunshine
laws that make the voter registration records open to the public and at no cost. This makes it
easier for researchers to obtain the data. Florida is the third-largest state, with 15 million voters
and 6 million mail ballots in 2020. The pandemic caused a huge influx of voters switching to or
at least requesting a mail ballot. This influx of new vote-by-mail users also increases the
likelihood of mistakes being made in returning the ballot (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021).
Using the 2020 Florida general election, therefore, combines a large dataset capable of finding
rare mistakes along with an increased likelihood of such rare mistakes happening. Other states,
such as California or New York, would be equally valid to use being similar size or larger.
However, I intended this research to follow up on claims made about racial bias in mail ballot
voting made by Smith (2018) so I used the Florida voter registration and mail ballot status that
was used in that research and follow-up research (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021) (Baringer,
Herron, & Smith, 2020) to be consistent.
Voter Registration and Mail Ballot Status
Data on the mail ballots that were sent out in the 2020 general election was retrieved
from the FL DOE. Each county reported a daily status of ballots sent and received from the day
they began to send out mail ballots on Oct. 5, 2020, to fifteen days after the election on Nov. 18,
2020. These files have the voter ID, county, mail address used, and ballot status of each voter
who was sent a ballot. Florida voter registration information is publicly available upon
registration with the FL DOE and monthly disks of voter registration and voter history
information are distributed. The list of voters was pulled from the November 2020 disk. The
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November disk was used because it would include anyone who registered for the general election
by the book closing date. The voter file has the registered address and mailing address of the
voter. Using the November voter registration file also ensures that the addresses in the voter
registration file are closest to the addresses from the mail ballot status files.
Table 1 VBM Status Codes
CODE
C

NAME
Cancelled

E
N
P

Voter Error
Unsigned
Provided

R

Requested

S
U

Standing
Undeliverable

V

Voted

DESCRPTION
Used if the voter moved to a different county or if they
requested the mail ballot to only be sent for the current
election. In the latter case, the status can change to c
even after it was recorded as voted.
Used to indicate a mismatched signature
The mail ballot was returned unsigned
Means it was mailed out, but the voter has not yet
returned it. This identifies the date the mail ballot was
sent out.
The voter will be sent the mail ballot when sent out. All
votes with an active vote by mail request start in this
status and are moved to Provided when the mail ballots
are sent out. If a voter requests a mail ballot after the
10-day deadline before the election, they are added as
Requested for the next election.
The mail address was returned as undeliverable. Mail
ballots are non-forwardable, so if the post office no
longer has the person registered at the address, then it is
returned to the SOE as undeliverable.
The mail ballot was returned and was successfully
counted.
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VBM Status Codes
The mail ballot status files contain a status code indicating the ballots sent and returned
status. Table 1 gives the list of status codes used in the file. What I specifically looked at was
the E status for Voter Error. Since N accounts for all unsigned mail ballots, mail ballots that had
a signature that did not match should be indicated by error code E for Voter Error. While voter
error may also include duplicates or people that died, these cases are rare (Burden & Gaines,
2013) so I counted all mail ballots with the E status as a mismatched signature. Counting
duplicates and deaths as mismatched signatures could make the results slightly higher than the
actual values. Fourteen counties reported no mismatch errors. They were all under 10,000 mail
ballots total which would be statistically viable given the low rate of signature mismatches. Of
these, four of the counties, Baker, DeSoto, Hamilton, and Hardee also reported no missing
signatures or late ballots either. Each of these counties has under 3,500 mail ballots each. Due
to their smaller size, they may have been able to correct any errors without reporting them. This
difference in reporting was controlled for by using county fixed-effects and clustering.
Late Ballots
If the ballot arrived after the election, I assumed that the error flag indicated that it was
late rather than a mismatched signature. There are two deadlines: 11-3-2020 for civilian ballots
and 10 days later, 11-13-2020, for military, overseas, or military dependents. Ballots that had a
return date after the deadline were marked as late. This overrides any other status such as
unsigned or mismatch. In some cases, the return date was not available for all records. The files
for Sarasota County had bad return dates. In this case, I used the Error Date, which is the date the
error was reported. Some records may have a status code or return date that conflicts. In this
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case, the voted status was given top priority, followed by late, and then a status that indicated
either unsigned or mismatched. This is the coding methodology used in Cottrell, Herron, &
Smith (2021).
Errors In versus Errors Unresolved
Because the mail ballot status files are cumulative for any voter who was sent a mail
ballot, the status changes between the daily files. By collecting all of the daily reports, I was
able to get a count of all mail ballots that were ever rejected, rather than only those that remained
unresolved. There is a mail ballot cure process for people to correct signature or other problems
with their ballot. If the voter cures their ballot, the final report will show the status as voted
rather than voter error. Because I want to determine whether there is a household size effect
causing mismatched signatures, I need to look at all of the errors coming into the elections office,
not just the ones that remained unresolved. Therefore, the count of mismatched ballots that I use
includes any ballot that was ever flagged as a mismatched signature. This is different from most
other studies that only examine the unresolved ballots (Baringer, Herron, & Smith, 2020)
(Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021) (Shino, Suttmann-Lea, & Smith, 2021).
Householding
The first question to answer about determining household size is whether to include only
voters who received a mail ballot or to include all voters at the address. It is possible that voters
without mail ballot requests may incorrectly return a mail ballot sent to another household
member. For example, there was a case presented to a canvassing board where a provisional
ballot claimed that the father had mistakenly submitted the son’s mail ballot believing it was his.
This shows a plausible condition where other voters in the household can incorrectly sign or
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submit another household member’s ballot. Even if the father had not registered to receive a
mail ballot, he might reasonably believe that he had and send in any mail ballot received at the
household. Therefore, I included all registered voters at the address in the household count. This
would account for someone else in the household mailing someone else’s ballot by mistake.
Mail ballots are frequently sent to an address other than the registered address. This is
commonly used by college students voting away from home, voters who are out of town on
election day, people who live part of the year in another location, military members, or civilians
overseas. Having a different mailing address affects the household count. The household count
indicates how many voters are at an address. If the mailing address is different from the
registered address, then the assumption is that the voter is at the mailing address and not the
registered address. The mail address from the VBM status files was added to the household
count first, then the registered address of any voter who did not receive a mail ballot was added
to the household count at that address. In total, there were approximately 225 million daily
VBM status records that were analyzed to determine if any of the 6 million voters with VBM
was ever flagged as a signature mismatch. The 6 million VBM addresses were then matched
along with an additional 15 million addresses from the voter files. Of the 6 million that were
sent a mail ballot, only 4.9 million returned a ballot.

Public Institutions
Addresses of public institutions such as universities, jails, rehabilitation centers, and SOE
offices are excluded from household counts. These are identified by having a household count
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over 10. If students at a university have unique addresses, then they are included. When a single
mail address is used across a university or campus, such as the University of Tampa which had
106 mail ballots all going to the same address, then they were excluded after exceeding the 10person limit. The SOE address is commonly used for homeless citizens as well as rehabilitation
centers. These institutions act as places where homeless citizens can receive mail.
The method that the mail ballots are distributed at public institutions is likely to differ
significantly from a household address. My assumption for a household is that there is a ‘stack
of mail ballots lying on the table’ where residents may or may not grab or sign the correct one.
If the distribution method at public institutions is more controlled, then it may remove the
possibility of signing the wrong ballot upfront. I, therefore, excluded them as being in a different
environment than the rest of the study.
Senior Homes
I created a separate category for senior homes. If there were 10 or more voters at the
address and all were age 65 or over, the address was flagged as a senior home. This uses the date
of birth to determine the age of each voter at the residence. These were excluded from
household counts for the same reasoning stated for removing public institutions.
Address Matching
To count the number of people in a household, I needed to match the addresses and count
the number of voters at each address. I used two methods to match addresses. The first method
did a direct string comparison between addresses. It compared the three address lines, the city,
state, zip, and country if available. If any address was spelled incorrectly or spelled differently,
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then the addresses would not match. To enhance the matching process, the second method used
an address parser to break the address into its components, such as street number, direction,
name, and type.
Standardization
I changed the addresses to use standard abbreviations. This way, the addresses are more
likely to match each other. For example, the addresses 10 EAST GLEN STREET and 10 E
GLEN ST do not match under a direct string comparison, even though those are the same
addresses. By changing them to use standard abbreviations, they would then match, and the
household counts were more accurate. Standard abbreviations (and misspellings) were retrieved
from the USPS (USPS, 2021). Examples of standard abbreviations are AVENUE → AVE,
APARTMENT → APT → UNIT, and street directions being abbreviated to N, S, E, W, NE,
NW, SE, SW
Parsing
I used the python module, US address, to parse the address into its component pieces.
This allowed me to do a direct comparison of each component, which is more accurate than the
unformatted address. For example, the addresses 10 E GLEN ST and 10 GLEN ST E do not
match under a direct string comparison, even though those are the same addresses. By changing
them to use standard abbreviations, they then match, and the household counts can be more
accurate.
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Differences in Address Matching Methods
After standardizing and parsing the addresses, more addresses were able to be correctly
matched. The mean household size increased from 1.67 to 2.08 using the standardized
addresses. This difference in means from a two-tailed t-test is significant with a p-value of 0.000
that the mean from the standardized method is greater than the original mean. Because the
standardized method more accurately matched addresses, I used the household size counts from
the standardized method.
Designing a Ballot with the Voter’s Name under the Signature Line
I came up with a ballot design that included the voter’s name in the signature area (Figure
7). This design moves the red signature box to be around the area where the voter’s name,
address, and barcoded information are printed for mailing. The barcode has to show through a
window on the outgoing envelope for it to be processed by the USPS. This means the barcode
has to remain where it is, and the rest of the design has to be moved around it. The design also
changes the layout from the portrait orientation in Figure 4 to landscape orientation. This change
in orientation may be more difficult for some election offices.

29

Figure 7 Envelope Design with Voter's Name by Signature
An alternative would be to leave the signature box where it is and print the voter’s name
under the existing signature line. The Center for Civic Design (2017) ballot shown in Figure 8
includes an example envelope design that printed the voter’s name under the signature line. The
problem with printing the ballots with the voter’s name on the original signature line is that it
prints the name twice on the ballot envelope. There is no legal issue with this, but normally the
non-identifying information, such as the oath and signature line is preprinted generically on the
ballots first. The voter’s name and address are printed on the ballot envelope later. This makes
it difficult for the two to remain in sync. The second print pass where the voter’s name is printed
could potentially misalign with the signature line. This may not only require a design change,
but also a change in the envelope printing process.
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Figure 8 Envelope Design with Voter Name by Existing Signature Line
Source: Center for Civic Design (2017)
A third procedural problem arises when changing the location of the signature line.
Especially from portrait to a landscape orientation or vice versa. The device that scans the
signatures off of the ballot envelope would need to be adjusted to target the new signature area
and possibly rotate the scanned image if the orientation changed. The signature scanning devices
should be able to adjust to a new area. Given the wide variety in the current designs of the
signature boxes and their location, this gives evidence that the scanning devices can be adjusted,
but there may be some limits. It is more of a question of whether election administrators would
be willing to adjust their system to try a new design.
What became evident is that I could not just change the ballot envelope design without
considering the entire process of how they are printed, mailed, and scanned in for counting. This
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proved to be another obstacle to running a test of the proposed ballot envelope design change.
Besides presenting the visual design, it would require ensuring the election administrator’s
printing and scanning systems could process the new design. As a result, testing of hypothesis 3
was excluded.
Ballot Designs
For testing mail ballot envelope designs, I requested a copy of the ballot envelope from
the 2020 general election from each of the 67 Florida counties. 64 of the 67 were returned.
Gadsden, Hardee, and Monroe counties did not reply. Their reported VBM totals were 7,727,
1,668, and 22,894 respectively putting them at the smaller end of the scale. Some counties have
a different envelope for civilian and UOCOVA voters that note the different rules and extended
deadlines allowed for military and overseas voters. In this case, the civilian envelope was used
in rating the envelope designs. The envelope designs were rated on criteria to evaluate
hypotheses 4 a-c. I also counted the number of languages printed on the ballot envelope.
Having to print instructions in multiple languages can reduce the amount of space available on
the ballot envelope, which in turn can restrict the ability to add some of the ballot features, such
as arrows. Counting the number of languages provides a control measure for determining
whether language requirements are reducing the ability to add design features. The Voting
Rights Act requires minority languages to be provided if a minority language group exceeds
either 10,000 voters or 5% of the voting-age population (Department of Justice, 2020). 76.5% of
the counties required both English and Spanish on the envelopes. Broward and Miami Dade had
three languages.

32

Arrow Front
I rated the envelope design on whether it included an indication on the front side that
voters needed to sign on the backside. Because there is some variation on the indication, I made
it scalar rather than binary, with zero being no indication and going up to three depending on
how much attention the notice gathered. While I was looking for an arrow as in Figure 10, I
scored them on any notification, either text or graphic with higher scores based on how much
attention it draws from the reader.
Minor Indication:
If the front of the ballot contains a note to sign the back, normally under the return
address area as in Figure 9, then I scored it as having a minor indication. The voter may not
notice it.

Figure 9 Arrow Front Minor Indication
Source: Baker County SOE (2020)
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Major Indication:
If the front of the ballot contains the arrow on the front as in Figure 10 (left), I scored it
as a major indication. If it did not have the arrow as in Figure 10 (right) but gets the voter’s
attention by being in the same placement area, then I also scored it as having a major indication.

Figure 10 Arrow Front Examples of Full Indication
Source: Left: Clay County SOE (2020). Right: Alachua County SOE (2020)
Extra Indication:
Some counties gave even more notice, such as including giant stop signs or extra flaps on
the envelope dedicated to making sure the voter signs the ballot. These were given a top score of
three.
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Figure 11 Extra Indication for Signature
Source: Brevard County SOE (2020)
Arrows on Back
I rated the envelope design on whether it included an arrow, stop sign or other symbols
on the backside that draws attention to the signature. This will be used in conjunction with the
front side indicator to see if one or the other works better, or if the effect requires both. Because
there is some variation on the indication, I made it scalar rather than binary.
Minor Indication:
If the back of the ballot contains an arrow to sign the back, but its placement is not
significantly large or different from the signature area, then I scored it as having a minor
indication. The voter may not notice it. Figure 12 shows examples of designs considered minor.
Normally, there is an arrow, but it blends in with the signature box. Most envelopes fall into this
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category because they do not have space for a larger arrow, especially if they have to
accommodate a Spanish translation.

Figure 12 Minor Arrow on Back
Source: Left: Seminole County SOE (2020). Right: Bradford County SOE (2020)
Major Indication:
If the back of the ballot contains an arrow to sign the back, and its placement is
significantly large or different from the signature area, then I scored it as having a major
indication. The voter should notice it.
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Figure 13 Major Arrow on Back
Source: Calhoun County SOE (2020)
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No Indication:
Some envelopes do not give any arrows or other notifications on the envelope other than
the signature line itself. Figure 14 gives examples. Note that by being outlined in red, it still
stands out, but for study purposes, this is considered the default.

Figure 14 No Arrow on Back
Source: Top: Hillsborough County SOE (2020) Bottom: Baker County SOE (2020)
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Power of Attorney
Some envelopes include a notice that power of attorney is not allowed. This could affect
older or disabled voters who normally have a person with power of attorney signing documents
for them. If the attorney signs for them, it would be considered a signature mismatch and be
recorded as a signature mismatch.
Full / Minor Indication:
Full indication, in this case, means that the notice was placed near the signature box
where the voter or attorney is most likely to see it when signing. Minor indication means the
notice was placed elsewhere on the envelope, such as being placed with other instructions. In
this case, the attorney may not see it when signing or may not read all parts of the envelope.

Figure 15 Power of Attorney - Full Indication
Source: Calhoun County SOE (2020)
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Figure 16 Power of Attorney - Minor Indication
Source: Citrus County SOE (2020)
Red Box Layout
For Hypothesis 4c, I indicated whether the signature area used the more distinctive red
box layout seen in Figure 6. About one-third of the counties use the red box design with little
variation. Since the red box design stood out and was consistently used, I measured its usage for
layout effects. Like the arrows, the red box is more attention getting and identifies the part
where the signature is required, therefore my expectation is that it will reduce the number of
unsigned ballots by drawing attention.

County Statistics
Because ballot envelope designs are per county, I combined them with aggregated counts
of late, unsigned, and mismatched signatures by county from the mail ballot and voter
registration data detailed above. I also collected statistics on the number of registered voters, the
number of mail ballots sent, and the voter turnout by county from the FL DOE. Of these, I used
the number of mail ballots as a control variable to account for the scale of mail ballots the county
processed. Counties processing more mail ballots are likely to have more sophisticated
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procedures than smaller counties (Alvarez, Hall, & Sinclair, 2008) or may have more budget to
allocate to more sophisticated ballot designs. The number of mail ballots worked better as a
control variable than the registered voter count since the dependent variables require a mail
ballot to be sent for them to occur.
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RESULTS
The pandemic caused a huge influx of voters switching to vote by mail. Mail ballots
increased from 2.7 million in 2016 to 4.8 million counted ballots in 2020. Democrats and NPAs
both doubled their mail ballot usage while Republicans only increased vote by mail usage by
36% (FLDOE, 2020). This indicates that distrust of vote by mail among Republicans had a
visible impact even with the pandemic. The resulting dataset of 6 million mail ballots is
potentially large enough to produce statistically significant results even though there is no
meaningful relation between variables. Because household size is not expected to have as large
of an occurrence rate as other factors, a large dataset was necessary to determine how frequently
it occurs. However, to prevent potential false reporting, results were not considered significant if
lower than the p=.001 level.
Household Size Effect
The first question to answer is whether there is an identifiable household size effect on
mismatched signatures. I ran a probit model to predict the likelihood of having a mismatched
signature controlling for age, race, party, mail ballot history, and mail zone. I used fixed-effects
for the county, and clustering errors by county since the county is repeated in the dataset and it
accounts for differences between counties. The probit model was used over the logistical model
so that I could later use a Heckman probit model to predict the likelihood of a signature
mismatch if all voters had returned a mail ballot. Figure 17 shows the probability of having a
mismatched signature increases steadily as the household size increases, as expected. The base
probability of the signature not matching for an individual with no one else in the household is
0.009%. This indicates the low baseline probability of a signature mismatch occurring at all. At
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this rate, an election administrator could expect 9 mismatched signatures per 100,000 ballots.
This low baseline probability emphasizes the need to use a large dataset to find a change in
something that has a low occurrence, to begin with.

Figure 17 Mismatched Signatures by Household Size
The probability increases to 0.00986% with the addition of a second household member
and goes up to 0.01851% at 10 people in the household. More importantly, the probability
steadily increases as the household size increases. The probit analysis confirms that the effects
of household size are significant at a 99.9% confidence level, which confirms hypothesis 1 that
signature mismatches increase as household size increases. There is a significant correlation.
Figure 17 shows the 95% confidence interval grows wider as household size increases.
This is expected since there are far fewer households with five or more members. This gives
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more uncertainty of the true probability in larger households. However, the confidence intervals
never exclude the starting interval at one person in the household. It is possible that the errors
seen at larger household sizes are still due to the error rate of a single individual and thus not
related to being in a household. I ran a t-test to compare the means between a single-member
household and those with a household size of two or more. The t-test confirmed that the mean
number of signature mismatches for households with two or more people was significantly
greater than single-member households. The difference is significant at the 99.9% confidence
interval and the confidence intervals between single-member homes and households with two or
more do not overlap. The increase in signature mismatches is therefore attributable to having
additional household members, not solely from the odds of one person having a mismatch. To
state that another way, if you selected a household with three people in it, you would see more
signature mismatches than from selecting three individual people.
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Table 2 Probit Regression of Signature Mismatches
probit

Probability of Signature Mismatch
variable
Probability
Robust
z
per unit change
std. error
household
0.02240%
.0066527
4.01
black
0.10881%
.0194233
6.67
Hispanic
0.09654%
.0197932
5.80
age
-0.02230%
.0019978
-13.28
2
age
0.00016%
.0000158
12.34
VBM History
-0.02167%
.0021866
-11.79
gender(female)
-0.08271%
.0098758
-9.97
NPA
0.04024%
.0093685
5.11
mail zone
0.16550%
.0349056
5.64
constant
-29.59
N
4,706,500
2
Pseudo R
0.1376
Errors clustered by county. All results significant at 99.9% confidence level

Probability
per 1 SD
0.04101%
0.05836%
0.05888%
-0.37153%
0.92691%
-0.14198%
-0.06093%
0.02792%
0.12813%

While small, the increase in signature mismatches from household size is comparable to
other variables. From calculating the standardized probabilities shown in Table 2, age and mail
ballot history are the largest influencers on signature mismatches, both of which decrease the
probability. The change from household size, while not the largest, is comparable to that of
blacks, Hispanics, and females. It is also surprisingly larger than party effects in terms of change
per standard deviation. Party effects were measured as NPA vs Democrat or Republican. The
implication was that by not getting information or instructions from the party, NPAs had more
signature errors. If having instructions available for party members decreases their error rate,
then identifying the voter’s name on the envelope to prevent a household member from signing
the wrong ballot should have as much or more effect than party affiliation. Each of these, while
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significant, are all just fractions of a percentage in differences. This emphasizes the fact that
signature mismatches are normally rare, to begin with, so I am looking for small marginal
increases or decreases that add up over a large scale. Fewer mail ballots having to go through
the cure process after a signature error can reduce staff costs for election officials, allow quicker
reporting of election results, and ultimately affect the outcome of close races.
Reversal in Age Effects
The previous literature treated age as a set of increasing age categories (Smith, 2018)
(Baringer, Herron, & Smith, 2020) (Shino, Suttmann-Lea, & Smith, 2021). Each of these found
that each increasing age group reduced the probability of late ballots, unsigned ballots, and
mismatched signatures. I found a similar trend but expect there to be a cut-off point where
signature mismatches begin to increase as one gets older and writing becomes more difficult. To
detect this, I added age squared to the regression. This creates a quadratic equation for age
effects that follow a hyperbolic curve. The curve peaked at age 72, with signature mismatches
decreasing up to that point, then increasing again after that age as displayed in Figure 18. Both
age and age squared were significant in regression analysis, indicating the drop-off at age 72 is
an equally significant effect as the decreasing effects on age before that. This also supports the
theory of older voters having writing difficulties or using other household members or caretakers
to sign the ballot for them. Both of these would cause a signature mismatch for older voters.
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Figure 18 Signature Mismatches by Age
Age versus Vote-by-Mail History
Cottrell, Herron, & Smith (2021) added a measure for the amount of experience a voter
had in using mail ballots. They counted someone as experienced using mail ballots if they voted
by mail in the previous two general elections. Inexperienced voters voted in person in the
previous two general elections before switching to using a mail ballot. They found that
inexperience significantly increases late and unsigned ballots in addition to age effects.
Specifically, young voters, both experienced and inexperienced had higher rates of late ballots
than older voters (Cottrell, Herron, & Smith, 2021, p. 20). This shows that age does not equal
experience or vice-versa. The two variables cannot be substituted for each other. Instead, they
can both be added as independent variables measuring different concepts.
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Cottrell, Herron, & Smith (2021) uses a short-term measure for experience. Since the
Florida voter files include a complete voter history since the voter registered to vote in Florida, I
created a long-term history of mail ballot experience to use. The voter history marks how the
person voted in each election, either in person, by mail, or through early voting. It also marks if
the mail ballot was approved or rejected. I counted all instances of voting by mail for the voter,
both successful and unsuccessful. I figured that unsuccessful attempts would either help voters
correct their mistakes if they continued voting by mail, or they would switch to in-person voting
and have less mail ballot experience. This total mail ballot count gives a long-term measure of
VBM experience. My results are similar to Cottrell, Herron, & Smith (2021). The long-term
measure of VBM experience had independent effects apart from age, and experience decreased
the probability of mismatched signatures. This shows both long-term and short-term measures of
experience returned the same results.
Household effect vs Racial effects
The second part of the study was to determine if racial effects coincide with household
effects. The assumption is that blacks and Hispanics have larger household sizes, therefore the
household size could be contributing to signature mismatches found by race. Hypothesis 2
predicts that the percent of signature mismatches attributed to blacks or Hispanics should
decrease once the household size is accounted for. First, though, I need to verify whether blacks
and Hispanics do have larger household sizes.
The Florida voter registration file uses nine categories for race. I condensed it down to
four categories: white, black, Hispanic, and other. I created dummy variables for black and
Hispanic since I was specifically interested in those. The histogram in Figure 19 gives a clearer
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picture of the distribution of household size by race. Whites have a higher percentage of single
or two-person households and a sharp drop-off at three or more. Blacks, Hispanics, and other
races have a more gradual drop-off of larger households.

HOUSEHOLD SIZE BY RACE
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Figure 19 Household Size by Race
It would be more accurate to say that whites have fewer people in the household than to
say that any other race has more per household. The drop-off rate for non-white households is
fairly similar whereas there is a sharp drop for white households starting at three or more.
Running a regression analysis between household size and black or Hispanic does confirm that
the difference in size compared to white households is significant at the 99.9% confidence
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interval with Hispanics having slightly larger households than blacks. This confirms the base
assumption that blacks and Hispanics have larger household sizes.
The next step is to determine if this larger household size accounts for some of the
signature mismatches being attributed to race. To test this, I ran a probit regression analysis
using two models. The first excluded household size to get a baseline effect for black and
Hispanic on signature mismatches. The second model then adds household size as an additional
independent variable to see if the black and Hispanic variables either drop their significance level
or drop the coefficient value.
Table 3 Race effects on signature mismatches
probit

Probability of Signature Mismatch
Without Household
With Household
variable Probability St. Err.
z
Probability St. Err.
z
0.02240%
.0066
4.01
household
0.11457%
.0190
7.12
0.10881%
.0194
6.67
black
0.10149%
.0201
5.99
0.09654%
.0197
5.80
Hispanic
-0.02324%
.0021 -12.81
-0.02230%
.0019 -13.28
age
0.00017%
.0000 12.37
0.00016%
.0000 12.34
age2
.0021 -11.75
-0.02167%
.0021 -11.79
VBM history -0.02170%
-0.08405%
.0102 -9.71
-0.08271%
.0098 -9.97
gender(F)
0.03934%
.0091
5.11
0.04024%
.0093
5.11
NPA
0.15571%
.0362
5.09
0.16550%
.0349
5.64
mail zone
.0746 -23.68
.0625 -29.59
constant
4,724,484
4,706,500
N
2
.1366
.1376
Pseudo R
Errors clustered by county. All results significant at 99.9% confidence level

Difference

0.00576%
0.00495%
-0.00094%
0.00001%
-0.00003%
-0.00134%
-0.00090%
-0.00979%

The results in Table 3 show that the significance level does not change. Black and
Hispanic remain significant at the 99.9% confidence level along with the other control variables.
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The drop in probability for black and Hispanic, highlighted in the box in Table 3, is minimal at
only a .005 point drop in the percentage of probability. The differences in the other control
variables are likewise slim and at times in the opposite direction. These changes in coefficients
without major changes in z-score or p-values indicate that household size does not explain some
of the effects of blacks and Hispanics, rather household size is its own independent variable that
has been taken out of the error term of the first model.

Placing the Voter’s Name under the Signature Line
I was unable to perform a study that tested whether placing the voter’s name under the
signature line reduced the number of mismatched signatures. This would require cooperation
with one or more of the county Supervisors of Elections to design and print the ballots. There
were city and local elections during 2021, but I needed to have an approved design months
before the election in order to get them printed before the deadline to send them to voters.
Before getting cooperation from election administrators, I need to make a convincing argument
that the problem of household members signing the wrong ballot is a real and significant
problem. That is what the first part of this project is intended to do. The second part of running
the ballot design experiment is expected to be done after finding evidence of the problem.
Ideally, getting cooperation from one of the election administrators to use the design
would lead to doing a difference-in-differences test where the new ballot design would be the
treatment and differences in the rate of signature mismatches would be the treatment effect. the
remaining counties would be the control group to compare against.
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Ballot Envelope Designs
To validate whether changing the ballot envelope design would have any significant
effect, I designed three tests that categorized design features by location, keywords, and layout.
The location regression tested whether placing an arrow on the front of the ballot to warn the
user to sign the back reduced the number of unsigned ballots. The second regression on
keywords tested whether placing a worded notice about power of attorney not being allowed
reduced the number of mismatched signatures. The third regression tested whether the red box
layout design did better at reducing the number of unsigned ballots.
Counties were the unit of analysis for the design tests since the envelope designs were by
county. This used the total count of unsigned ballots or mismatched signatures per county as the
dependent variable. This allows standard regression analysis instead of probit or logit. This is
also in line with what election administrators need to know since it answers whether the ballot
design will reduce the number of errors their office sees. If it can reduce the number of overall
ballot errors, then it is more likely to convince an election official to adopt a change rather than
focusing on decreases in the individual probability of someone having an error.
The initial results were not promising. On their own, none of the designs had any
significant effect. The red box design in Table 6 came close to being significant but did not
reach the p-level of 0.05 or less for 95% confidence. The front arrows and the power of attorney
message fared the worst at a p-score of .184.
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Table 4 Regression Analysis of Location Arrows
unsigned ballots

OLS Regression
Coefficient
arrow Front
arrow Back
arrow Both
Language
VBM Count
constant
N
R-squared

-369.0078
-385.8464
270.0914
253.2237
0.0048094
103.8038
64
0.4529

Robust St. Err.
274.2193
224.4636
155.8373
220.1549
.0021877
221.6801

p
0.184
0.091
0.088
0.255
0.032**

*** 99% CI; ** 95% CI; * 90% CI; Non-standardized coefficients

Table 5 Regression Analysis of Power of Attorney Key Words
OLS Regression

signature mismatches

Coefficient
Power of Attorney
Language
VBM Count
constant
N
R-squared

74.00251
40.79607
0.0015506
-50.12271
64
0.1981

Robust St. Err.
55.07925
75.67432
.0006615
100.3604

*** 99% CI; ** 95% CI; * 90% CI; Non-standardized coefficients
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p
0.184
0.255
0.032**

Table 6 Regression Analysis of Red Box Layout
unsigned ballots

OLS Regression
Coefficient
Red Box
Language
VBM Count
constant
N
R-squared

-369.0078
88.64682
0.0056862
-305.495
64
0.4582

Robust St. Err.
274.2193
220.1549
.0021877
221.6801

p
0.051
0.623
0.026**

*** 99% CI; ** 95% CI; * 90% CI; Non-standardized coefficients

Vote by Mail Count
Figure 20 shows the distribution of mail ballots by county. The distribution is skewed
with a right-side tail. The majority of counties have fewer than 50,000 mail ballots while the top
fifth of the counties skews the results with volumes up to 500,000. Because there was a large
variance in county size and correspondingly VBM counts I scaled the VBM count into near
quintiles. The top quintile contains the counties with 125,000 up to 500,000+ ballots that
skewed the VBM count overall. The remaining quintiles highlight just how small the remaining
counties are. The bottom one-fifth of the counties have less than 3,000 mail ballots and thus see
few errors overall. As with economies of scale, the scale of incoming mail ballots a county
processes affects the budget, tools, and processes the county has available, so it makes economic
sense to scale the VBM count so that it represents the county’s size, budget, and process. The
scaled approach makes the results more meaningful to election administrators as they can see
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where their county fits into the scale more easily.

VBM by County
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Figure 20 VBM Counts by County and Scaled VBM Category
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The side effect is that the scaled VBM values often lost their significance whereas the original
VBM count was always strongly significant. Overall, the number of ballot errors increases as
the number of mail ballots increases as expected. By scaling the value, the coefficients,
representing the number of expected errors per scale of ballots, continue to increase as the VBM
scale increases.
In Table 8 the scaled model shows how much unsigned ballots increase at each level of
the VBM scale. The significance, or p-values, drop out of significance, however. This was
expected for the smaller-scaled values but the large end of the VBM scale also fell out of
significance. This may indicate that counties that operate on the same scale in terms of the
number of ballots still have differences in procedures that cause some to have higher or lower
rates of ballot errors than other counties within the same scale. By scaling the VBM count then,
the model gives a more detailed picture of what is happening within each scale rather than just
the overall effect between the largest and smallest VBM count. Using the VBM count directly
gives a better adjusted R-squared of .52 which shows the number of mail ballots coming in
accounts for a large portion of the model. But to get a more detailed picture of what happens in
each county based on size, the scaled VBM is more meaningful.
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Table 7 Regression Analysis of Envelope Designs using VBM Count
unsigned ballots

OLS Regression
Coefficient
arrow Front
arrow Back
arrow Both
Power of Attorney
Red Box
Language
VBM Count
constant
N
R-squared

-414.3970
-377.4878
319.5918
-124.4834
602.2397
121.0475
0.004777
283.2146
64
0.5253

Robust St. Err.
250.8690
194.1613
139.7395
117.8879
257.9025
205.8597
.0020100
255.154

p

per 1 SD

0.104
0.057
0.026**
0.296
0.023**
0.559
0.021**

-.3090
-.3010
.5784
-.0977
.2580
.0523
.5038

*** 99% CI; ** 95% CI; * 90% CI;

Table 8 Regression Analysis of Envelope Designs using Scaled VBM
unsigned ballots

OLS Regression
Coefficient
arrow Front
arrow Back
arrow Both
Power of Attorney
Red Box
Language

-686.1213
-646.3173
437.2684
-73.73985
703.2979
437.683

Robust St. Err.
409.3851
336.8909
215.1103
113.2866
326.4668
504.6753

p

per 1 SD

0.100
0.060
0.047**
0.518
0.036**
0.390

-.3090
-.3010
.5784
-.0977
.2580
.0523

0.423
0.940
0.878
0.097

-.1050
.0093
.0250
.2525

Scaled VBM
3K
10K
50K
125K
constant
N
R-squared

-294.9177
25.5322
70.22285
687.7257
343.7432
64
0.4554

365.5183
339.1168
454.4214
406.9636
432.5715

*** 99% CI; ** 95% CI; * 90% CI;
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For the models in Table 7 and Table 8, I combined the location, keyword, and layout
designs into a single regression to test the overall effects of each design. Since all designs appear
on the ballot envelope, they can be considered to be working together rather than individually.
When combined, the red box layout and having arrows on both sides became significant across
all methods. This indicates that additions to the ballot design can work together for a greater
effect. The red box layout and arrows, however, had the reverse effect on unsigned ballots.
Counties using the red box design increased the number of unsigned ballots rather than
decreasing them. This is the opposite of what I expected. I expected that the more distinctive
red box layout would attract the voter’s attention to the signature area. The same happened with
the arrows. Only the combined effect of front and back arrows is significant, and it goes in the
opposite direction of the arrows themselves. Since both the front and back arrows have to be
present for the arrowBoth coefficient to be part of the regression equation, it only acts to negate
the presence of the arrows. This means the presence of arrows has little to no effect.
Overall, the results are consistent suggesting the simpler designs are better. On their
own, each feature of the design does not make a significant change, but in combination, they can.
However, the more attention-getting red box design and arrows had the reverse effect suggesting
simple designs are more effective. The more complex designs did not significantly change voter
behavior nor reduce the number of unsigned ballots. The more complicated designs may be
causing too much clutter or distractions. For the proposal of adding the voter’s name under the
signature line, the implication here is that the simpler design from the Center for Civic Design
(2017) in Figure 8 would work best.
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The other problem here is that the regression analysis may be attempting to measure too
many changes at the same time. A more robust approach would be to use the proposed design in
one county and do a difference-in-differences analysis of before and after results. This would
remove errors due to the myriad of differences in each county’s ballot. VBM counts alone are
not enough of a control variable to account for all the variation in envelope designs. It also
aligns with the current process of adopting envelope design changes where one county election
official tries it in an off-year and reports the results to other counties.
It can be argued that the power of attorney test is most similar to adding the voter’s name
on the envelope. This would suggest that adding the voter’s name would have no effect since the
power of attorney results were ineffective in all models. However, power of attorney is not
common whereas everyone has a name. People will skip past information that does not relate to
them while homing in on items that do. Especially a person’s name. Including the voter’s name
in a simple layout as in the Center for Civic Design layout (Figure 8) should be effective.
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CONCLUSION
The anecdotal comments about household members signing the wrong ballot were
empirically validated There is a significant household size effect on signature mismatches
confirming hypothesis 1. Household members are signing each other’s ballots. While the
probability of a signature mismatch is extremely low to begin with, at only 0.009%, it does
steadily increase as household size increases. The increase is also extremely low, increasing to
only 0.018% at 10 people in the household. This may not present much of a problem for
election administrators until they start processing a hundred thousand ballots or more, but it
confirms another problem that they will run into. Another important aspect of this finding is that
election administrators can attribute more of the signature mismatches to human error rather than
bias by election officials. With conspiracy theories spreading about election procedures and
machinery throwing out ballots (or not throwing out enough), this finding puts the blame back on
the voter rather than bias in the signature matching devices or election officials. It is an error
that election administrators can try to avoid by adding the voter’s name.
Accounting for household size had no effect on signature mismatches attributed to race.
Even though the data confirmed white households have smaller households overall, the larger
household size for blacks and Hispanics did not decrease the number of signature mismatches
previously attributed to race. Blacks and Hispanics had the same results with or without
adjusting for household size. I did not further investigate why blacks or Hispanics had an
increased number of signature mismatches. I can only confirm that it was not related to
household size, therefore hypothesis 2 is rejected. I would also note here that while the results in
Table 3 show that blacks and Hispanics were significant in this research, my research counted all
60

signature mismatches that occurred whereas most prior research only counted the ones that were
not cured at some point during the process. Therefore, the results may not be comparable.
Ballot designs indicate that simpler is better. All of the hypothesis 4 predictions are
rejected because they either produced no significant results or the results went in the opposite
direction. Since the more attention getting designs returned results indicating they work in the
opposite direction, the lesson is that the simpler designs work better. It would be more practical
to have one election office test the design so that there is only one design change being tested at
a time. This would limit interference from other effects and would provide a set of before and
after results to empirically compare. The problem is still in convincing election administrators to
make a change. While this research has confirmed that there is a problem with household
members signing the wrong ballot, changing the envelope design to correct it may present more
difficulties in printing and scanning than the effort is worth. Therefore, the simpler design from
the Center for Civic Design (Figure 8) is recommended over my original design (Figure 7) which
attempts to move the signature area to match where the voter name is already printed in the
mailing window. The latter design is vastly more complicated and is likely to cause as many
printing and scanning issues as it tries to solve.
Any design changes may at best only reduce the number of errors by fractions of a
percent. Still, there are 15 million voters in Florida with 4.9 million mail ballots processed in
2020. Florida is known for close races and recounts. In 2018, three top-ticket races, the US
Senate race, gubernatorial race, and a state cabinet race were all close enough to trigger
mandatory recounts. In 2020, the Florida State Senate seat for District 37 in Miami was decided
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by only 32 votes, triggering a manual recount and investigations into election fraud (Gross,
2020). This gives evidence that close races are to be expected.
Florida is infamous, however, for the hanging chad debacle of the Bush/Gore race in
2000. The incident shows how minor flaws in ballot design can lead to processing errors and
ambiguity in voters’ intent. Because of this, punch-card ballots were banned by the Help
America Vote Act in 2002 (ES&S, n.d.). More recently, by placing the voting instructions in
the first column along with the first race for US Senate, the 2018 ballot for Broward County,
Florida, caused voters to skip over the US Senate race (Ross, 2020). The Florida Legislature
responded by requiring the voting instructions to be at the top of the ballot, separated from the
races. In both cases, design changes were made to prevent the problem in the future, but were
election officials aware of the potential problems beforehand? By empirically validating that
household members are signing the wrong ballot, it informs election administrators that there is
an existing problem. Ideally, the design solution of placing the voter’s name under the signature
line can be implemented to prevent the problem before it becomes a state-wide or national media
fiasco.
Finally, it’s also a way for election officials to reduce costs. Every rejected ballot that
comes in requires more election officials to review it along with efforts to contact the voter by
phone, email, and regular mail. To make a small design change to the envelope that will prevent
errors later is worth the cost.
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Future Research
I plan to continue working with election administrators and the Center for Civic Design
to see if there is a more feasible design that could be tested. More importantly though, while my
research did not find the household size to affect racial results it is still worth investigating the
racial results further. The prior research that led to this study often found and reported racial
effects but too often we do not know the real cause. Having information on the voter’s race
allows us to see racial outcomes, but it does not give a contextual picture that identifies where
the discrepancies are coming from. By looking at household members signing the wrong ballot,
I was able to pinpoint a specific cause that may be having a racial effect. While it didn’t have a
noticeable effect, the goal of trying to identify potential causes of racial differences is still there.
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APPENDIX A: DUPLICATES
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Voters registered by the book closing date can request a mail ballot up to ten days before
the election. Therefore, the mail ballot status will have more mail addresses than the voter file as
voters request a mail ballot after the voter registration files have closed. Voters that have moved
can also update their addresses after book closing. This is seen in the mail ballot status with a
voter ID appearing in two or more counties. This causes duplicate entries in the data.
The matching to select which record is the duplicate is:
1) If the status is V for voted, E=Error, or N=Not Signed, then that record is kept as the
original
2) If the status is U for Undeliverable, R=Requested, or S=Standing (Not Sent or Not
Delivered), then the other record is kept as the original
3) If the return date is not null, the record is kept as the original. The status can be
C=Cancelled and have a return date, indicating that the voter only wanted a mail
ballot for the current election.
4) If the status is P for Provided, then that record is kept as the original. It is assumed
that the voter is correctly registered in the county but did not return the ballot.
5) If the sent date is not null, then that record is kept as the original
6) Otherwise, the first entry in the pair is chosen.
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APPENDIX B: COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS
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I received permission from the Civic Center for Design to use images from their published field
guide. A pdf copy of the original can be provided upon request.
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